{"resultsPerPage":1,"startIndex":0,"totalResults":1,"format":"NVD_CVE","version":"2.0","timestamp":"2026-04-21T05:03:41.475","vulnerabilities":[{"cve":{"id":"CVE-2026-23279","sourceIdentifier":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","published":"2026-03-25T11:16:22.333","lastModified":"2026-04-18T09:16:16.163","vulnStatus":"Awaiting Analysis","cveTags":[],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mac80211: fix NULL pointer dereference in mesh_rx_csa_frame()\n\nIn mesh_rx_csa_frame(), elems->mesh_chansw_params_ie is dereferenced\nat lines 1638 and 1642 without a prior NULL check:\n\n    ifmsh->chsw_ttl = elems->mesh_chansw_params_ie->mesh_ttl;\n    ...\n    pre_value = le16_to_cpu(elems->mesh_chansw_params_ie->mesh_pre_value);\n\nThe mesh_matches_local() check above only validates the Mesh ID,\nMesh Configuration, and Supported Rates IEs.  It does not verify the\npresence of the Mesh Channel Switch Parameters IE (element ID 118).\nWhen a received CSA action frame omits that IE, ieee802_11_parse_elems()\nleaves elems->mesh_chansw_params_ie as NULL, and the unconditional\ndereference causes a kernel NULL pointer dereference.\n\nA remote mesh peer with an established peer link (PLINK_ESTAB) can\ntrigger this by sending a crafted SPECTRUM_MGMT/CHL_SWITCH action frame\nthat includes a matching Mesh ID and Mesh Configuration IE but omits the\nMesh Channel Switch Parameters IE.  No authentication beyond the default\nopen mesh peering is required.\n\nCrash confirmed on kernel 6.17.0-5-generic via mac80211_hwsim:\n\n  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000\n  Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n  RIP: 0010:ieee80211_mesh_rx_queued_mgmt+0x143/0x2a0 [mac80211]\n  CR2: 0000000000000000\n\nFix by adding a NULL check for mesh_chansw_params_ie after\nmesh_matches_local() returns, consistent with how other optional IEs\nare guarded throughout the mesh code.\n\nThe bug has been present since v3.13 (released 2014-01-19)."},{"lang":"es","value":"En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\nwifi: mac80211: corrige la desreferencia de puntero NULL en mesh_rx_csa_frame()\n\nEn mesh_rx_csa_frame(), elems->mesh_chansw_params_ie es desreferenciado en las líneas 1638 y 1642 sin una verificación de NULL previa:\n\n    ifmsh->chsw_ttl = elems->mesh_chansw_params_ie->mesh_ttl;\n    ...\n    pre_value = le16_to_cpu(elems->mesh_chansw_params_ie->mesh_pre_value);\n\nLa verificación mesh_matches_local() anterior solo valida el ID de Malla, la Configuración de Malla y los IEs de Tasas Soportadas. No verifica la presencia del IE de Parámetros de Cambio de Canal de Malla (ID de elemento 118). Cuando un frame de acción CSA recibido omite ese IE, ieee802_11_parse_elems() deja elems->mesh_chansw_params_ie como NULL, y la desreferencia incondicional causa una desreferencia de puntero NULL del kernel.\n\nUn par de malla remoto con un enlace de par establecido (PLINK_ESTAB) puede activar esto enviando un frame de acción SPECTRUM_MGMT/CHL_SWITCH manipulado que incluye un ID de Malla y un IE de Configuración de Malla coincidentes, pero omite el IE de Parámetros de Cambio de Canal de Malla. No se requiere autenticación más allá del emparejamiento de malla abierta predeterminado.\n\nFallo confirmado en el kernel 6.17.0-5-generic a través de mac80211_hwsim:\n\n  BUG: desreferencia de puntero NULL del kernel, dirección: 0000000000000000\n  Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n  RIP: 0010:ieee80211_mesh_rx_queued_mgmt+0x143/0x2a0 [mac80211]\n  CR2: 0000000000000000\n\nSolución añadiendo una verificación de NULL para mesh_chansw_params_ie después de que mesh_matches_local() retorne, consistente con cómo otros IEs opcionales son protegidos a lo largo del código de malla.\n\nEl error ha estado presente desde la v3.13 (lanzada el 19-01-2014)."}],"metrics":{},"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/017c1792525064a723971f0216e6ef86a8c7af11","source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22a9adea7e26d236406edc0ea00b54351dd56b9c","source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b5f282b1b7241ef624c3399a1cdff0bb1a3eeab","source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/753ad20dcbe36b67088c7770d8fc357d7cc43e08","source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be8b82c567fda86f2cbb43b7208825125bb31421","source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cc6d5a3c0a854aeae00915fc5386570c86029c60","source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f061336f072ab03fd29270ae61fede46bf8fd69d","source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f5d8af683410a8c82e48b51291915bd612523d9a","source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"}]}}]}