{"resultsPerPage":1,"startIndex":0,"totalResults":1,"format":"NVD_CVE","version":"2.0","timestamp":"2026-05-01T21:38:42.858","vulnerabilities":[{"cve":{"id":"CVE-2025-55292","sourceIdentifier":"security-advisories@github.com","published":"2026-01-28T00:15:49.607","lastModified":"2026-03-02T21:17:27.593","vulnStatus":"Analyzed","cveTags":[],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"Meshtastic is an open source mesh networking solution. In the current Meshtastic architecture, a Node is identified by their NodeID, generated from the MAC address, rather than their public key. This aspect downgrades the security, specifically by abusing the HAM mode which doesn't use encryption. An attacker can, as such, forge a NodeInfo on behalf of a victim node advertising that the HAM mode is enabled. This, in turn, will allow the other nodes on the mesh to accept the new information and overwriting the NodeDB. The other nodes will then only be able to send direct messages to the victim by using the shared channel key instead of the PKC. Additionally, because HAM mode by design doesn't provide any confidentiality or authentication of information, the attacker could potentially also be able to change the Node details, like the full name, short code, etc. To keep the attack persistent, it is enough to regularly resend the forged NodeInfo, in particular right after the victim sends their own. A patch is available in version 2.7.6.834c3c5."},{"lang":"es","value":"Meshtastic es una solución de red mallada de código abierto. En la arquitectura actual de Meshtastic, un Nodo se identifica por su NodeID, generado a partir de la dirección MAC, en lugar de su clave pública. Este aspecto degrada la seguridad, específicamente al abusar del modo HAM que no utiliza cifrado. Un atacante puede, como tal, falsificar un NodeInfo en nombre de un nodo víctima anunciando que el modo HAM está habilitado. Esto, a su vez, permitirá a los otros nodos en la malla aceptar la nueva información y sobrescribir la NodeDB. Los otros nodos solo podrán entonces enviar mensajes directos a la víctima utilizando la clave de canal compartida en lugar de la PKC. Además, debido a que el modo HAM por diseño no proporciona ninguna confidencialidad o autenticación de la información, el atacante también podría potencialmente cambiar los detalles del Nodo, como el nombre completo, el código corto, etc. Para mantener el ataque persistente, es suficiente con reenviar regularmente el NodeInfo falsificado, en particular justo después de que la víctima envíe el suyo propio. Un parche está disponible en la versión 2.7.6.834c3c5."}],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"security-advisories@github.com","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N","baseScore":8.2,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"LOW","availabilityImpact":"NONE"},"exploitabilityScore":3.9,"impactScore":4.2}]},"weaknesses":[{"source":"security-advisories@github.com","type":"Primary","description":[{"lang":"en","value":"CWE-348"}]}],"configurations":[{"nodes":[{"operator":"OR","negate":false,"cpeMatch":[{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:meshtastic:meshtastic_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"2.7.6","matchCriteriaId":"3B2CC022-CD93-4C68-8211-93C5386E4004"}]}]}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/meshtastic/firmware/commit/e5e8683cdba133e726033101586c3235a8678893","source":"security-advisories@github.com","tags":["Patch"]},{"url":"https://github.com/meshtastic/firmware/security/advisories/GHSA-45vg-3f35-7ch2","source":"security-advisories@github.com","tags":["Exploit","Mitigation","Vendor Advisory"]}]}}]}