{"resultsPerPage":1,"startIndex":0,"totalResults":1,"format":"NVD_CVE","version":"2.0","timestamp":"2026-04-20T19:24:46.405","vulnerabilities":[{"cve":{"id":"CVE-2025-22030","sourceIdentifier":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","published":"2025-04-16T15:15:55.607","lastModified":"2025-10-28T19:05:41.203","vulnStatus":"Analyzed","cveTags":[],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm: zswap: fix crypto_free_acomp() deadlock in zswap_cpu_comp_dead()\n\nCurrently, zswap_cpu_comp_dead() calls crypto_free_acomp() while holding\nthe per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex.  crypto_free_acomp() then holds scomp_lock\n(through crypto_exit_scomp_ops_async()).\n\nOn the other hand, crypto_alloc_acomp_node() holds the scomp_lock (through\ncrypto_scomp_init_tfm()), and then allocates memory.  If the allocation\nresults in reclaim, we may attempt to hold the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex.\n\nThe above dependencies can cause an ABBA deadlock.  For example in the\nfollowing scenario:\n\n(1) Task A running on CPU #1:\n    crypto_alloc_acomp_node()\n      Holds scomp_lock\n      Enters reclaim\n      Reads per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1)\n\n(2) Task A is descheduled\n\n(3) CPU #1 goes offline\n    zswap_cpu_comp_dead(CPU #1)\n      Holds per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1))\n      Calls crypto_free_acomp()\n      Waits for scomp_lock\n\n(4) Task A running on CPU #2:\n      Waits for per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1) // Read on CPU #1\n      DEADLOCK\n\nSince there is no requirement to call crypto_free_acomp() with the per-CPU\nacomp_ctx mutex held in zswap_cpu_comp_dead(), move it after the mutex is\nunlocked.  Also move the acomp_request_free() and kfree() calls for\nconsistency and to avoid any potential sublte locking dependencies in the\nfuture.\n\nWith this, only setting acomp_ctx fields to NULL occurs with the mutex\nheld.  This is similar to how zswap_cpu_comp_prepare() only initializes\nacomp_ctx fields with the mutex held, after performing all allocations\nbefore holding the mutex.\n\nOpportunistically, move the NULL check on acomp_ctx so that it takes place\nbefore the mutex dereference."},{"lang":"es","value":"En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: mm: zswap: corrección del bloqueo de crypto_free_acomp() en zswap_cpu_comp_dead(). Actualmente, zswap_cpu_comp_dead() llama a crypto_free_acomp() mientras mantiene el mutex acomp_ctx por CPU. A continuación, crypto_free_acomp() mantiene scomp_lock (mediante crypto_exit_scomp_ops_async()). Por otro lado, crypto_alloc_acomp_node() mantiene scomp_lock (mediante crypto_scomp_init_tfm()) y luego asigna memoria. Si la asignación resulta en una recuperación, podemos intentar mantener el mutex acomp_ctx por CPU. Las dependencias anteriores pueden causar un bloqueo de ABBA. Por ejemplo, en el siguiente escenario: (1) Tarea A ejecutándose en la CPU n.º 1: crypto_alloc_acomp_node() Retiene scomp_lock Ingresa a recuperación Lee per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1) (2) La tarea A se desprograma (3) La CPU n.º 1 se desconecta zswap_cpu_comp_dead(CPU n.º 1) Retiene per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1)) Llama a crypto_free_acomp() Espera a scomp_lock (4) Tarea A ejecutándose en la CPU n.º 2: Espera a per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1) // Lee en la CPU n.º 1 BLOQUEO INTERMEDIO Dado que no es necesario llamar a crypto_free_acomp() con el mutex acomp_ctx por CPU retenido en zswap_cpu_comp_dead(), muévalo después de que se desbloquee el mutex. También se desplazan las llamadas acomp_request_free() y kfree() para mantener la coherencia y evitar posibles dependencias de bloqueo sutil en el futuro. Con esto, solo se establece el valor NULL de los campos acomp_ctx con el mutex retenido. Esto es similar a cómo zswap_cpu_comp_prepare() solo inicializa los campos acomp_ctx con el mutex retenido, después de realizar todas las asignaciones antes de retener el mutex. Oportunistamente, se desplaza la comprobación de valores NULL en acomp_ctx para que se realice antes de la desreferencia del mutex."}],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"nvd@nist.gov","type":"Primary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","baseScore":5.5,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"LOCAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"NONE","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":1.8,"impactScore":3.6}]},"weaknesses":[{"source":"nvd@nist.gov","type":"Primary","description":[{"lang":"en","value":"CWE-667"}]}],"configurations":[{"nodes":[{"operator":"OR","negate":false,"cpeMatch":[{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionStartIncluding":"6.12.12","versionEndExcluding":"6.12.23","matchCriteriaId":"C007FC9C-EF72-4E8D-B8AF-1F5CEBB036E0"},{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionStartIncluding":"6.13.1","versionEndExcluding":"6.13.11","matchCriteriaId":"A1ED3A9A-88AD-47D5-B428-93C7630E46F8"},{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionStartIncluding":"6.14","versionEndExcluding":"6.14.2","matchCriteriaId":"FADAE5D8-4808-442C-B218-77B2CE8780A0"},{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.13:-:*:*:*:*:*:*","matchCriteriaId":"5A3F9505-6B98-4269-8B81-127E55A1BF00"}]}]}],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/717d9c35deff6c33235693171bacbb03e9643fa4","source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":["Patch"]},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/747e3eec1d7d124ea90ed3d7b85369df8b4e36d2","source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":["Patch"]},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8d18000e9d2d97aaf105f5f9b3b0e8a6fbf8b96","source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":["Patch"]},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c11bcbc0a517acf69282c8225059b2a8ac5fe628","source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":["Patch"]}]}}]}