{"resultsPerPage":1,"startIndex":0,"totalResults":1,"format":"NVD_CVE","version":"2.0","timestamp":"2026-05-05T06:47:58.754","vulnerabilities":[{"cve":{"id":"CVE-2022-39293","sourceIdentifier":"security-advisories@github.com","published":"2022-10-13T19:15:09.750","lastModified":"2025-10-27T13:57:06.663","vulnStatus":"Modified","cveTags":[],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"Azure RTOS USBX is a high-performance USB host, device, and on-the-go (OTG) embedded stack, that is fully integrated with Azure RTOS ThreadX. The case is, in [_ux_host_class_pima_read](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/master/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c), there is data length from device response, returned in the very first packet, and read by [L165 code](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L165), as header_length. Then in [L178 code](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L178), there is a “if” branch, which check the expression of “(header_length - UX_HOST_CLASS_PIMA_DATA_HEADER_SIZE) > data_length” where if header_length is smaller than UX_HOST_CLASS_PIMA_DATA_HEADER_SIZE, calculation could overflow and then [L182 code](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L182) the calculation of data_length is also overflow, this way the later [while loop start from L192](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L192) can move data_pointer to unexpected address and cause write buffer overflow. The fix has been included in USBX release [6.1.12](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/releases/tag/v6.1.12_rel). The following can be used as a workaround: Add check of `header_length`: 1. It must be greater than `UX_HOST_CLASS_PIMA_DATA_HEADER_SIZE`. 1. It should be greater or equal to the current returned data length (`transfer_request -> ux_transfer_request_actual_length`)."},{"lang":"es","value":"Azure RTOS USBX es una pila embebida de host, dispositivo y on-the-go (OTG) USB de alto rendimiento, que está totalmente integrada con Azure RTOS ThreadX. El caso es que, en [_ux_host_class_pima_read](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/master/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c), se presenta una longitud de datos de la respuesta del dispositivo, devuelta en el primer paquete, y leída por [L165 code](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L165), como header_length. Entonces en [L178 code](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L178), se presenta una rama \"if\", que comprueba la expresión de \"(header_length - UX_HOST_CLASS_PIMA_DATA_HEADER_SIZE) ) data_length\" donde si header_length es menor que UX_HOST_CLASS_PIMA_DATA_HEADER_SIZE, el cálculo podría desbordarse y entonces [L182 code](https://github. com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L182) el cálculo de data_length también es desbordado, de esta forma el posterior [inicio del bucle while desde L192](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L192) puede mover data_pointer a una dirección no esperada y causar un desbordamiento del buffer de escritura. La corrección ha sido incluida en USBX versión  [6.1.12](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/releases/tag/v6.1.12_rel). Puede usarse lo siguiente como mitigación: Añadir la comprobación de \"header_length\": 1. Debe ser mayor que \"UX_HOST_CLASS_PIMA_DATA_HEADER_SIZE\". 1. Debe ser mayor o igual que la longitud de datos devuelta actualmente (\"transfer_request -) ux_transfer_request_actual_length\")"}],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"security-advisories@github.com","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H","baseScore":8.6,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"LOW","integrityImpact":"LOW","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":3.9,"impactScore":4.7},{"source":"nvd@nist.gov","type":"Primary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":9.8,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":3.9,"impactScore":5.9}]},"weaknesses":[{"source":"security-advisories@github.com","type":"Secondary","description":[{"lang":"en","value":"CWE-191"}]}],"configurations":[{"nodes":[{"operator":"OR","negate":false,"cpeMatch":[{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:a:eclipse:threadx_usbx:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.1.12","matchCriteriaId":"FAB0B44A-E01F-4F4C-AFFF-A32FA32E775A"}]}]}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/releases/tag/v6.1.12_rel","source":"security-advisories@github.com","tags":["Release Notes","Third Party Advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/security/advisories/GHSA-gg76-h537-xq48","source":"security-advisories@github.com","tags":["Patch","Third Party Advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/releases/tag/v6.1.12_rel","source":"af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108","tags":["Release Notes","Third Party Advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/security/advisories/GHSA-gg76-h537-xq48","source":"af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108","tags":["Patch","Third Party Advisory"]}]}}]}